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Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis

Author

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  • Cockx, Bart

    () (Ghent University)

  • Ghirelli, Corinna

    () (Bank of Spain)

  • Van der Linden, Bruno

    () (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain)

Abstract

This paper develops a partial equilibrium job search model to study the behavioral and welfare implications of an Unemployment Insurance (UI) scheme in which job search requirements are imposed on UI recipients with hyperbolic preferences. We show that, if the search requirements are well chosen, a perfect monitoring scheme can in principle increase the job finding rate and, contrary to what happens with exponential discounting, it can raise the expected lifetime utility of the current and future selves of sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. The same holds for naive agents if the welfare criterion ignores their misperception problem. In sum, introducing a perfect monitoring scheme can be a Pareto improvement. However, if claimants have the opportunity to withdraw from the UI scheme, their long-run utility can even be lower than in the absence of job search requirements. Imperfections in the measurement of job-search effort further reduce the chances that monitoring raises the welfare of the unemployed.

Suggested Citation

  • Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 7266, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7266
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    Cited by:

    1. Koning, Pierre, 2013. "Making Work Pay for the Indebted: The Effect of Debt Services on the Exit Rates of Unemployed Individuals," IZA Discussion Papers 7873, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2014. "Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 80-95.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social efficiency; hyperbolic discounting; non-compliance; job search monitoring; job search model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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