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Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK

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  • McVicar, Duncan

Abstract

Because unemployment benefit reforms tend to package together changes to job search requirements, monitoring and assistance, few existing studies have been able to empirically isolate the effects of job search monitoring intensity on the behaviour of unemployment benefit claimants. This paper exploits periods where monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn during a series of Benefit Office refurbishments -- with the regime otherwise unchanged -- to allow such identification. During these periods of zero monitoring the hazard rates for exits from claimant unemployment and for job entry both fall.

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  • McVicar, Duncan, 2008. "Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 1451-1468, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:15:y:2008:i:6:p:1451-1468
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    Cited by:

    1. Bart COCKX & Muriel DEJEMEPPE & Andrey LAUNOV & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2011. "Monitoring, Sanctions and Front-Loading of Job Search in a Non-Stationary Model," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2011042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Berg, Gerard J. van den & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wolff, Joachim, 2015. "Under heavy pressure : intense monitoring and accumulation of sanctions for young welfare recipients in Germany," IAB Discussion Paper 201534, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    3. Pedro S. Martins & Sofia Pessoa e Costa, 2014. "Reemployment effects from increased activation: Evidence from times of crisis," Working Papers 52, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    4. Cockx, Bart & Dejemeppe, Muriel, 2010. "The Threat of Monitoring Job Search: A Discontinuity Design," IZA Discussion Papers 5337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Bas van der Klaauw & Jan C. van Ours, 2010. "Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions affect Job Finding Rates," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-064/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Ronald Bachmann & Daniel Baumgarten, 2013. "How do the unemployed search for a job? – Evidence from the EU Labour Force Survey," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-25, December.
    7. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Imperfect Monitoring of Job Search: Structural Estimation and Policy Design," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 75-120.
    8. Micklewright, John & Nagy, Gyula, 2010. "The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: Evidence from a field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 180-187, January.
    9. Muriel Dejemeppe & Bruno Van der Linden & Andrey Launov & Bart Cockx, 2011. "Monitoring and Sanctions in a Non-Stationary Structural Job-Search Model," 2011 Meeting Papers 501, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. van den Berg, Gerard J. & Uhlendorff, Arne & Wolff, Joachim, 2019. "The impact of sanctions for young welfare recipients on transitions to work and wages and on dropping out," Working Paper Series 2019:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    11. Pedro S. Martins & Sofia Pessoa e Costa, 2014. "Reemployment and Substitution Effects from Increased Activation: Evidence from Times of Crisis," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp590, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    12. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 7266, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    13. repec:eee:pubeco:v:169:y:2019:i:c:p:65-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:3:p:541-570 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Petrongolo, Barbara, 2009. "The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1234-1253, December.
    16. van den Berg, Gerard J. & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2013. "Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring," IZA Discussion Papers 7740, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2017. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini 's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," TEPP Working Paper 2017-08, TEPP.
    18. Duncan McVicar, 2014. "The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-49, July.
    19. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2014. "Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 80-95.
    20. Schiprowski, Amelie, 2017. "The Role of Caseworkers in Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from Unplanned Absences," IZA Discussion Papers 11040, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Gautier, Pieter A. & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2009. "Institutions and labor market outcomes in the Netherlands," Working Paper Series 2009:28, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    22. Schiprowski, Amelie & Arni, Patrick, 2016. "Strengthening Enforcement in Unemployment Insurance. A Natural Experiment," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145723, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    23. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2018. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini’s optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," Working Papers halshs-01878890, HAL.
    24. Jonas Maibom & Michael Rosholm & Michael Svarer, 2017. "Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Early Meetings and Activation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 541-570, July.
    25. Cockx, Bart & Dejemeppe, Muriel, 2012. "Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity design," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 729-737.

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