Job search monitoring intensity, unemployment exit and job entry: Quasi-experimental evidence from the UK
Because unemployment benefit reforms tend to package together changes to job search requirements, monitoring and assistance, few existing studies have been able to empirically isolate the effects of job search monitoring intensity on the behaviour of unemployment benefit claimants. This paper exploits periods where monitoring has been temporarily withdrawn during a series of Benefit Office refurbishments -- with the regime otherwise unchanged -- to allow such identification. During these periods of zero monitoring the hazard rates for exits from claimant unemployment and for job entry both fall.
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