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The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: Evidence from a field experiment

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  • Micklewright, John
  • Nagy, Gyula

Abstract

Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups. Treatment increases the monitoring of claims -- claimants make more frequent visits to the employment office and face questioning about their search behaviour. Treatment has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.

Suggested Citation

  • Micklewright, John & Nagy, Gyula, 2010. "The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: Evidence from a field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 180-187, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:180-187
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    Cited by:

    1. Belot, Michèle & Kircher, Philipp & Muller, Paul, 2015. "Providing Advice to Job Seekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on On-Line Advice," CEPR Discussion Papers 10967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Simoes, Nadia, 2013. "Subsídio de desemprego: uma revisão da literatura teórica e empírica
      [Unemployment insurance: a survey]
      ," MPRA Paper 52332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. H. Lehmann & A. Muravyev, 2011. "Labor markets and labor market institutions in transition economies," Working Papers wp783, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Holger Bonin & Ulf Rinne, 2014. "‘Beautiful Serbia’ - objective and subjective outcomes of active labour market policy in a transition economy," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 22(1), pages 43-67, January.
    5. Marco Caliendo & Ricarda Schmidl, 2016. "Youth unemployment and active labor market policies in Europe," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-30, December.
    6. Verónica Escudero & Elva López Mourelo, 2018. "‪La Garantie européenne pour la jeunesse‪. Bilan systématique des mises en œuvre dans les pays membres," Travail et Emploi, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(1), pages 89-122.
    7. Tuomala, Juha & Hämäläinen, Kari & Hämäläinen, Ulla, 2014. "The labour market impacts of a youth guarantee: lessons for Europe?," Working Papers 60, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    8. repec:ilo:ilowps:488891 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. van den Berg, Gerard J. & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2013. "Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring," IZA Discussion Papers 7740, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2017. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini 's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," TEPP Working Paper 2017-08, TEPP.
    11. Duncan McVicar, 2014. "The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 1-49, July.
    12. Lachowska, Marta & Meral, Merve & Woodbury, Stephen A., 2016. "Effects of the unemployment insurance work test on long-term employment outcomes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 246-265.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Field experiment Monitoring Job search Unemployment insurance Hungary;

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • P23 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population

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