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Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity design

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  • Cockx, Bart
  • Dejemeppe, Muriel

Abstract

Since July 2004, the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants has been monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 present in the first year of the reform to evaluate the effect of a notification sent at least eight months before job search is verified. Eight months after this notification and prior to the first monitoring interview, transitions to employment have increased by nearly nine percentage points compared to the counterfactual of no reform. Participation in training is raised, but not significantly, while withdrawals from the labor force are not affected.

Suggested Citation

  • Cockx, Bart & Dejemeppe, Muriel, 2012. "Monitoring job search effort: An evaluation based on a regression discontinuity design," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 729-737.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:5:p:729-737
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.05.017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerard J. van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2006. "Counseling And Monitoring Of Unemployed Workers: Theory And Evidence From A Controlled Social Experiment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 895-936, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hohmeyer, Katrin & Wolff, Joachim, 2016. "Of carrots and sticks: The effect of workfare announcements on the job search behaviour and reservation wage of welfare recipients," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145523, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Bart Cockx & Stijn Baert, 2015. "Contracting Out Mandatory Counselling and Training for Long-Term Unemployed. Private For-Profit or Non-Profit, or Keep it Public?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5587, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Marios Michaelides & Peter Mueser, 2018. "Are Reemployment Services Effective? Experimental Evidence from the Great Recession," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 37(3), pages 546-570, June.
    4. Pedro S. Martins & Sofia Pessoa e Costa, 2014. "Reemployment effects from increased activation: Evidence from times of crisis," Working Papers 52, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    5. Cockx, Bart, 2013. "Youth Unemployment in Belgium: Diagnosis and Key Remedies," IZA Policy Papers 66, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. De Brouwer, Octave & Leduc, Elisabeth & Tojerow, Ilan, 2019. "The Unexpected Consequences of Job Search Monitoring: Disability Instead of Employment?," IZA Discussion Papers 12304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Patrick Arni & Amelie Schiprowski, 2018. "Job Search Requirements, Effort Provision and Labor Market Outcomes," CESifo Working Paper Series 7200, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe & Andrey Launov & Bruno Van der Linden, 2018. "Imperfect Monitoring of Job Search: Structural Estimation and Policy Design," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 75-120.
    9. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna, 2016. "Scars of recessions in a rigid labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 162-176.
    10. Pedro S. Martins & Sofia Pessoa e Costa, 2014. "Reemployment and Substitution Effects from Increased Activation: Evidence from Times of Crisis," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp590, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    11. Peter Mueser & Marios Michaelides, 2015. "Are Reemployment Services Effective? Experimental Evidence from the Great Recession (WP 15-09 is now WP 18-04)," Working Papers 1509, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised Feb 2018.
    12. Arni, Patrick & Schiprowski, Amelie, 2016. "Strengthening Enforcement in Unemployment Insurance: A Natural Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 10353, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Muller, Paul & van der Klaauw, Bas & Heyma, Arjan, 2017. "Comparing Econometric Methods to Empirically Evaluate Job-Search Assistance," Working Papers in Economics 691, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    14. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis," IZA Discussion Papers 7266, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. repec:eee:pubeco:v:169:y:2019:i:c:p:65-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2017. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini 's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," TEPP Working Paper 2017-08, TEPP.
    17. Duncan McVicar, 2014. "The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-49, July.
    18. Patrick Arni & Amelie Schiprowski, 2016. "Strengthening Enforcement in Unemployment Insurance: A Natural Experiment," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 16/680, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    19. Arni, Patrick & Schiprowski, Amelie, 2018. "Job Search Requirements, Effort Provision and Labor Market Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 11765, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Cockx, Bart & Ghirelli, Corinna & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2014. "Is it socially efficient to impose job search requirements on unemployed benefit claimants with hyperbolic preferences?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 80-95.
    21. Lachowska, Marta & Meral, Merve & Woodbury, Stephen A., 2016. "Effects of the unemployment insurance work test on long-term employment outcomes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 246-265.
    22. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2018. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini’s optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," Working Papers halshs-01878890, HAL.
    23. Lukas Fervers, 2016. "Fast track to the labour market or highway to hell? The effect of activation policies on quantity and quality of labour market integration," IAW Discussion Papers 125, Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; Monitoring job search; Regression discontinuity;

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate

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