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The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: evidence from a field experiment

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  • John Micklewright

    () (Depatment of Quantitative Social Science - Institute of Education, University of London.)

  • Gyula Nagy

    (Department of Human Resources, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

Programme administration is a relatively neglected issue in the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups. Treatment increases the monitoring of claims - claimants make more frequent visits to the employment office and face questioning about their search behaviour. Treatment has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.

Suggested Citation

  • John Micklewright & Gyula Nagy, 2009. "The effect of monitoring unemployment insurance recipients on unemployment duration: evidence from a field experiment," DoQSS Working Papers 09-02, Department of Quantitative Social Science - UCL Institute of Education, University College London.
  • Handle: RePEc:qss:dqsswp:0902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gerard J. van den Berg & Bas van der Klaauw, 2006. "Counseling And Monitoring Of Unemployed Workers: Theory And Evidence From A Controlled Social Experiment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(3), pages 895-936, August.
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. After all, not that much moral hazard in unemployment insurance?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-01-20 21:03:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Michèle Belot & Philipp Kircher & Paul Muller, 2019. "Providing Advice to Jobseekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on Online Advice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1411-1447.
    2. Duncan McVicar, 2014. "The impact of monitoring and sanctioning on unemployment exit and job-finding rates," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-49, July.
    3. Sebastien Menard, 2019. "The impact of benefit sanctions on equilibrium wage dispersion and job vacancies," TEPP Working Paper 2019-08, TEPP.
    4. Simoes, Nadia, 2013. "Subsídio de desemprego: uma revisão da literatura teórica e empírica
      [Unemployment insurance: a survey]
      ," MPRA Paper 52332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. van den Berg, Gerard J & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2013. "Structural Empirical Evaluation of Job Search Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 9751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. H. Lehmann & A. Muravyev, 2011. "Labor markets and labor market institutions in transition economies," Working Papers wp783, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. De Brouwer, Octave & Leduc, Elisabeth & Tojerow, Ilan, 2019. "The Unexpected Consequences of Job Search Monitoring: Disability Instead of Employment?," IZA Discussion Papers 12304, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Holger Bonin & Ulf Rinne, 2014. "‘Beautiful Serbia’ - objective and subjective outcomes of active labour market policy in a transition economy," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 22(1), pages 43-67, January.
    9. Marco Caliendo & Ricarda Schmidl, 2016. "Youth unemployment and active labor market policies in Europe," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-30, December.
    10. Verónica Escudero & Elva López Mourelo, 2018. "?La Garantie européenne pour la jeunesse?. Bilan systématique des mises en œuvre dans les pays membres," Travail et Emploi, La DARES, vol. 0(1), pages 89-122.
    11. Tuomala, Juha & Hämäläinen, Kari & Hämäläinen, Ulla, 2014. "The labour market impacts of a youth guarantee: lessons for Europe?," Working Papers 60, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Lachowska, Marta & Meral, Merve & Woodbury, Stephen A., 2016. "Effects of the unemployment insurance work test on long-term employment outcomes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 246-265.
    13. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2018. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini’s optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," Working Papers halshs-01878890, HAL.
    14. Marios Michaelides & Peter Mueser & Jeffrey Smith, 2019. "Youth Unemployment and U.S. Job Search Assistance Policy during the Great Recession," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 13-2019, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    15. repec:ilo:ilowps:488891 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Sebastien Menard & Solenne Tanguy, 2017. "Revisiting Hopenhayn and Nicolini 's optimal unemployment insurance with job search monitoring and sanctions," TEPP Working Paper 2017-08, TEPP.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    field experiment; monitoring; job search; unemployment insurance; Hungary;

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • P23 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population

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