Do unemployment insurance recipients actively seek work? Evidence from randomized trials in four U.S. States
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- Ashenfelter, Orley & Ashmore, David & Deschenes, Olivier, 2000. "Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Evidence From Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States," IZA Discussion Papers 128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
References listed on IDEAS
- Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise, 1985.
"Technical Problems in Social Experimentation: Cost versus Ease of Analysis,"
NBER Chapters,in: Social Experimentation, pages 187-220
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jerry A. Hausman & David A. Wise, 1983. "Technical Problems in Social Experimentation: Cost versus Ease of Analysis," NBER Working Papers 1061, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James J. Heckman & Jeffrey Smith & Nancy Clements, 1997. "Making The Most Out Of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting For Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 487-535.
- James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, 1995. "Assessing the Case for Social Experiments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 85-110, Spring.
- Walter Corson & David Long & Walter Nicholson, 1985. "Evaluation of the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 9af520d14c1b4654b8080d304, Mathematica Policy Research.
- repec:mpr:mprres:7757 is not listed on IDEAS
- Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097 Elsevier.
- Douglas Wolf & David Greenberg, 1986. "The Dynamics of Welfare Fraud: An Econometric Duration Model in Discrete Time," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 21(4), pages 437-455.
More about this item
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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