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Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis

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Abstract

This paper studies the effects of differential tax treatment toward married and single individuals in the US on marriage formation and composition, divorce and labor supply. We develop a marriage market model with search frictions and heterogeneous agents that is sufficiently rich to capture key elements of the problem under consideration. We then calibrate the model and use it to evaluate the quantitative effects of a number of tax reforms aimed at making the tax law neutral with respect to marital status. We find that reforms can have substantial effects on the labor supply of females and on the degree of assortative mating.

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  • Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, 2000. "Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200015, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwo:uwowop:200015
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:restud:v:85:y:2018:i:3:p:1543-1576. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Melvyn G. Coles & Marco Francesconi, 2013. "Equilibrium Search and the Impact of Equal Opportunities for Women," CESifo Working Paper Series 4556, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Knowles, John, 2007. "Why Are Married Men Working So Much? Home Production, Household Bargaining and Per-Capita Hours," IZA Discussion Papers 2909, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Shoichi Sasaki, 2017. "Empirical analysis of the effects of increasing wage inequalities on marriage behaviors in Japan," Discussion Papers 1705, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    5. Alexander Bick & Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, 2018. "Taxation and Labour Supply of Married Couples across Countries: A Macroeconomic Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(3), pages 1543-1576.
    6. Guner, Nezih & Kaygusuz, Remzi & Ventura, Gustavo, 2008. "Taxation, Aggregates and the Household," CEPR Discussion Papers 6702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Fehr, Hans & Kallweit, Manuel & Kindermann, Fabian, 2017. "Families and social security," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 30-56.
    8. repec:eee:jjieco:v:46:y:2017:i:c:p:27-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Andres Erosa & Luisa Fuster & Diego Restuccia, 2002. "Fertility Decisions and Gender Differences in Labor Turnover, Employment, and Wages," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 856-891, October.
    10. Hans Fehr & Manuel Kallweit & Fabian Kindermann, 2013. "Reforming Family Taxation in Germany - Labor Supply vs. Insurance Effects," CESifo Working Paper Series 4386, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Fatih Guvenen & Michelle Rendall, 2015. "Women's Emancipation through Education: A Macroeconomic Analysis," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 931-956, October.
    12. Shannon Seitz, 2009. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(3), pages 385-437, July.
    13. Steve Laufer & Ahu Gemici, 2009. "Marriage and Cohabitation," 2009 Meeting Papers 1191, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. repec:esx:essedp:742 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Robert A. Pollak, 2011. "Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 216-244, June.
    16. Guner, Nezih & Kaygusuz, Remzi & Ventura, Gustavo, 2013. "Childcare Subsidies and Household Labor Supply," CEPR Discussion Papers 9775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Marina Mendes, 2013. "Taxes, education,marriage and labor supply," Working Papers 1303, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    18. John Knowles & Nezih Guner, 2007. "Marital Instability and the Distribution of Wealth," 2007 Meeting Papers 785, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Nezih Guner & Remzi Kaygusuz & Gustavo Ventura, 2012. "Taxation and Household Labour Supply," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1113-1149.
    20. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    21. Hans Fehr & Manuel Kallweit & Fabian Kindermann, 2009. "Marital Risk, Family Insurance, and Public Policy," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 226, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    22. Randall Wright, 2014. "Marriage, Markets and Money: A Coasian Theory of Household Formation," 2014 Meeting Papers 237, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    23. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2001. "The Timing of Births: A Marriage Market Analysis," Penn CARESS Working Papers 49355d43c11f2314075e8b54e, Penn Economics Department.
    24. José María Da Rocha & Luisa Fuster, 2003. "Why are Fertility and Female Participation Rates Positively Correlated across OECD countries?," Working Papers 72, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    25. repec:cpt:journl:v::y:2016:i:144:p:61-107 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior

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