Assortive Matching and Search
This paper reexamines a classic insight of the assignment literature - when match- ing is assortative - in an environment with search frictions. We assume a continuum of heterogeneous agents who can produce only in pairs . If two agents form a match, they generate a ow of divisible output. We depart from the neoclassical assignment literature (e.g. Becker 1973) in assuming that match creation is time consuming: each unmatched agent faces a Poisson arrival of potential mates (Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1990). As matching precludes further search, agents must weigh the opportunity cost of ceasing to search for better op- tions, against the benet of producing immediately.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:michet:98-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.