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Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States

Author

Listed:
  • Orley Ashenfelter

    (Princeton University)

  • David Ashmore

    (Private Consultant)

  • Olivier Deschenes

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment insurance (Ul) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on nonexperimental data, that a prime cause of overpayment is the failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively search for work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system.

Suggested Citation

  • Orley Ashenfelter & David Ashmore & Olivier Deschenes, 1998. "Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States," Working Papers 791, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:412
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Ham, John C & LaLonde, Robert J, 1996. "The Effect of Sample Selection and Initial Conditions in Duration Models: Evidence from Experimental Data on Training," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 175-205, January.
    4. Bruce D. Meyer, 1995. "Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(1), pages 91-131, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Guillaume Allègre, 2008. "L’expérimentation sociale des incitations financières à l’emploi : questions méthodologiques et leçons des expériences nord-américaines," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2008-22, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    2. M. Daniele Paserman, 2008. "Job Search and Hyperbolic Discounting: Structural Estimation and Policy Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1418-1452, August.
    3. Stefano DellaVigna & M. Daniele Paserman, 2005. "Job Search and Impatience," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(3), pages 527-588, July.
    4. Robert Breunig & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark & Yvonne Dunlop & Marion Terrill, 2003. "Assisting the Long-Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomised Trial," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(244), pages 84-102, March.
    5. John Van Reenen, 2004. "Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal for the Young Unemployed in Context," NBER Chapters,in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000, pages 461-496 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. David Card & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "What Have Two Decades of British Economic Reform Delivered?," NBER Chapters,in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000, pages 9-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6148 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "The High-Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990s," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 30(1), pages 1-88.
    10. Gray, Matthew & Hunter, Boyd, 2005. "Indigenous Job Search Success," MPRA Paper 1393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Jeff Borland & Yi-Ping Tseng, 2003. "How Do Administrative Arrangements Affect Exit from Unemployment Payments? The Case of the Job Seeker Diary in Australia," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2003n27, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    12. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung: das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs," Kiel Working Papers 1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    13. Petrongolo, Barbara, 2009. "The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1234-1253, December.
    14. Barbara Petrongolo, 2007. "What Are the Long-Term Effects of UI? Evidence from the UK JSA Reform," CEP Discussion Papers dp0841, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    15. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 1999. "Is the Threat of Training More Effective Than Training Itself? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9913, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    16. Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 2002. "Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," NBER Working Papers 8825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Emmanuel Duguet & Florent Frémigacci & Yannick L’Horty, 2008. "Indemnisation du chômage et retour à l’emploi : un examen économétrique," Documents de recherche 08-07, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    18. Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 1998. "The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on aggregate unemployment outflows," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 07 Sep 2000.
    19. Fougère, Denis & Pradel, Jacqueline & Roger, Muriel, 2005. "Does Job-Search Assistance Affect Search Effort and Outcomes? A Microeconometric Analysis of Public versus Private Search Methods," IZA Discussion Papers 1825, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    20. Johansson, Per, 2008. "The importance of employer contacts: Evidence based on selection on observables and internal replication," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 350-369, June.
    21. Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per & Larsson, Laura, 2005. "Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment," Working Paper Series 2005:15, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    22. Johansson, Per, 2006. "Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect," Working Paper Series 2006:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment insurance; work search requirements; randomized trials;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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