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Job Search Requirements, Effort Provision and Labor Market Outcomes

Author

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  • Arni, Patrick

    () (University of Bristol)

  • Schiprowski, Amelie

    () (IZA)

Abstract

How effective are effort targets? This paper provides novel evidence on the effects of job search requirements on effort provision and labor market outcomes. Based on large-scale register data, we estimate the returns to required job search effort, instrumenting individual requirements with caseworker stringency. Identification is ensured by the conditional random assignment of job seekers to caseworkers. We find that the duration of un- and non- employment both decrease by 3% if the requirement increases by one monthly application. When instrumenting actual applications with caseworker stringency, an additionally provided monthly application decreases the length of spells by 4%. In line with theory, we further find that the effect of required effort decreases in the individual's voluntary effort. Finally, the requirement level causes small negative effects on job stability, reducing the duration of re- employment spells by 0.3% per required application. We find a zero effect on re-employment wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Arni, Patrick & Schiprowski, Amelie, 2018. "Job Search Requirements, Effort Provision and Labor Market Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 11765, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11765
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stefanie Behncke & Markus Frölich & Michael Lechner, 2010. "A Caseworker Like Me - Does The Similarity Between The Unemployed and Their Caseworkers Increase Job Placements?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(549), pages 1430-1459, December.
    2. Card, David & Levine, Phillip B., 2000. "Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 107-138, October.
    3. Petrongolo, Barbara, 2009. "The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1234-1253, December.
    4. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2012. "The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20 Years," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(2), pages 701-752.
    5. Jeff Borland & Yi-Ping Tseng, 2007. "Does a Minimum Job Search Requirement Reduce Time on Unemployment Payments? Evidence from the Jobseeker Diary in Australia," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(3), pages 357-378, April.
    6. Johannes F. Schmieder† & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2011. "The Effects Of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over The Business Cycle: Evidence From Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over Twenty Years," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-063, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    effort targets; job search behavior; unemployment insurance; incentives;

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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