The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3 (6), 1386-1417|
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- Martin, John P. & Grubb, David, 2001. "What works and for whom: a review of OECD countries' experiences with active labour market policies," Working Paper Series 2001:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Dan A. Black & Jeffrey A. Smith & Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, 1999.
"Is the Threat of Training More Effective Than Training Itself? Experimental Evidence from the UI System,"
UWO Department of Economics Working Papers
9913, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Jeffrey Smith, 2000. "Is the Threat of Training More Effective than Training Itself? Experimental Evidence from the UI System," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1660, Econometric Society.
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