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Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment

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  • Hartman, Laura
  • Hesselius, Patrik
  • Johansson, Per

Abstract

We study the effects of screening stringency in the Swedish sickness insurance system by exploiting a field experiment. The experiment was conducted on 270,000 individuals in two geographical areas with the treatment group randomized by date of birth. The screening of eligibility was reduced for the treated by the postponement of the requirement for a doctor's certificate from day eight to day fifteen in a sickness benefit spell. The results show that extending the waiting period increased the length of sickness absence by on average 0.6days. The experiment increased sickness benefit expenses but reduced the number of visits to a doctor. Our results show that postponing the requirement for a doctor's certificate increases public expenses for the sickness insurance system.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartman, Laura & Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per, 2013. "Effects of eligibility screening in the sickness insurance: Evidence from a field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 48-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:20:y:2013:i:c:p:48-56
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.10.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Alpino, Matteo & Hauge, Karen Evelyn & Kotsadam, Andreas & Markussen, Simen, 2022. "Effects of dialogue meetings on sickness absence—Evidence from a large field experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas & Vriend, Sandra, 2020. "Audit regimes in long-term care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 272-298.
    3. Stijn Baert & Bas van der Klaauw & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2018. "The effectiveness of medical and vocational interventions for reducing sick leave of self‐employed workers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 139-152, February.
    4. Johansson, Per & Karimi, Arizo & Nilsson, J Peter, 2014. "Gender differences in shirking: monitoring or social preferences? Evidence from a field experiment," Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies 2014:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    5. Catherine Pollak, 2017. "The impact of a sick pay waiting period on sick leave patterns," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(1), pages 13-31, January.
    6. Pathric Hägglund & Per Johansson & Lisa Laun, 2020. "The Impact of CBT on Sick Leave and Health," Evaluation Review, , vol. 44(2-3), pages 185-217, April.
    7. Carlo Alberto Biscardo & Alessandro Bucciol & Paolo Pertile, 2015. "Who should monitor job sick leave?," Working Papers 18/2015, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    8. Carlo Alberto Biscardo & Alessandro Bucciol & Paolo Pertile, 2019. "Job sick leave: Detecting opportunistic behavior," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 373-386, March.
    9. Thomas Leoni & René Böheim, 2018. "Fehlzeitenreport 2018. Krankheits- und unfallbedingte Fehlzeiten in Österreich – Präsentismus und Absentismus," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 61487, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monitoring; Randomized experiment; Absenteeism; Sickness insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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