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Die Sanktionspolitik der Arbeitsagenturen nach den Hartz-Reformen: Analyse der Wirkungen des Ersten Gesetztes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt

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  • Müller, Kai-Uwe
  • Oschmiansky, Frank

Abstract

Im Rahmen des 'Ersten Gesetzes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt' wurden die Zumutbarkeitskriterien verschärft und die Sperrzeitendauer reformiert, um die Sanktionsinstrumente der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) leichter anwenden zu können, den Missbrauch von Versicherungsleistungen zu reduzieren sowie den Abgang aus dem Leistungsbezug zu beschleunigen. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Wirkungen der Reformen auf die Sanktionspolitik der BA und ihrer regionalen Arbeitsagenturen. Dabei liegt das Hauptinteresse auf der Implementation der Sanktionen in den Arbeitsagenturen vor und nach den Hartz-Reformen. Der Fokus ist auf die Aussprache von Sperrzeiten, die den Bezug von Lohnersatzleistungen unterbrechen, gerichtet. Die Analysen basieren auf regionalen Geschäftsdaten der BA-Statistik, die für den Zeitraum 2000 bis 2004 quartalsweise vorliegen, einer schriftlichen Befragung aller Arbeitsagenturen sowie qualitativen Interviews in zehn Agenturen. Die empirische Analyse beruht auf linearen Paneldatenmodellen.

Suggested Citation

  • Müller, Kai-Uwe & Oschmiansky, Frank, 2006. "Die Sanktionspolitik der Arbeitsagenturen nach den Hartz-Reformen: Analyse der Wirkungen des Ersten Gesetztes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2006-116, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzblpe:spi2006116
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Hofmann, 2008. "Work Incentives? Ex Post Effects of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions - Evidence from West Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 2508, CESifo.
    2. Schneider, Julia, 2008. "The effect of unemployment benefit II sanctions on reservation wages," IAB-Discussion Paper 200819, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].

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