IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/2f935765-37ac-4cae-aa85-e9d73d63bc94.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Modeling Financial Incentives to get Unemployment Back to Work

Author

Listed:
  • Boone, J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • van Ours, J.C.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Boone, J. & van Ours, J.C., 2000. "Modeling Financial Incentives to get Unemployment Back to Work," Discussion Paper 2000-02, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2f935765-37ac-4cae-aa85-e9d73d63bc94
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/534077/2.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(5), pages 565-585, September.
    2. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    3. Manning, Alan, 2009. "You can't always get what you want: The impact of the UK Jobseeker's Allowance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 239-250, June.
    4. John Van Reenen, 2004. "Active Labor Market Policies and the British New Deal for the Young Unemployed in Context," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980–2000, pages 461-496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Müller, Kai-Uwe, 2007. "Observed and unobserved determinants of unemployment insurance benefit sanctions in Germany: Evidence from matched individual and regional administrative data," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2007-107, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Belot, Michele & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 403-418, December.
    7. Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.
    8. Müller, Kai-Uwe & Oschmiansky, Frank, 2006. "Die Sanktionspolitik der Arbeitsagenturen nach den Hartz-Reformen: Analyse der Wirkungen des Ersten Gesetztes für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2006-116, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    10. Barbara Hofmann, 2008. "Work Incentives? Ex Post Effects of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions - Evidence from West Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 2508, CESifo.
    11. Neugart, Michael & Storrie, Donald, 2002. "Temporary work agencies and equilibrium unemployment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment FS I 02-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 2001. "Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment : Theory and Application for Belgium," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2001005, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Bruno Van der Linden & Eric Dor, 2003. "The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on regular employment," Working Papers 2003-ECO-01, IESEG School of Management.
    14. Bruno, VAN DER LINDEN, 2003. "Unemployment insurance and training in an equilibrium matching model with heterogeneous agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2003001, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    15. Solenne Tanguy, 2006. "Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(1), pages 43-64.
    16. Kock, Udo, 2001. "Institutions, incentives and social policy in the 'Dutch model'," Serie Research Memoranda 0003, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    17. Ruud de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memorandum 100, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    18. Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 1998. "The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on aggregate unemployment outflows," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 07 Sep 2000.
    19. Ruud de Mooij, 2004. "Towards efficient unemployment insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Memorandum 100.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    20. Butter, Frank A.G. den & Kock, Udo, 2001. "Social security, economic growth and poverty : theoretical considerations and guidelines for institutional arrangements," Serie Research Memoranda 0002, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
    21. Jensen, Peter & Rosholm, Michael & Svarer, Michael, 2003. "The response of youth unemployment to benefits, incentives, and sanctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 301-316, June.
    22. Samir Amine & Pedro Lages Dos Santos, 2010. "Technological choices and unemployment benefits in a matching model with heterogenous workers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 101(1), pages 1-19, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:2f935765-37ac-4cae-aa85-e9d73d63bc94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.