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Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation

Author

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  • Solenne Tanguy

Abstract

The provision of unemployment insurance is associated with adverse incentive effects caused by moral hazard. Monitoring together with sanctions is one of possible instruments to restore incentives without reducing the unemployment subsidies provided by the unemployment insurance system. Benefit reductions or interruptions are imposed if unemployed workers do not comply with job search guidelines. This paper investigates the effectiveness of such benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment. We use a simple job search model where the unemployment agency can simultaneously monitor search intensity of unemployed and wage offers rejection. We find that benefit sanctions for job refusals have negative effects on search intensity. Consequently, job offers monitoring can increase the unemployment rate and decrease welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Solenne Tanguy, 2006. "Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(1), pages 43-64.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:repdal:redp_161_0043
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    Cited by:

    1. Talarowski, David, 2012. "Estimation des élasticités du modèle de recherche d'emploi sur données françaises [Estimation of the elasticities of the model of job search on French data]," MPRA Paper 38366, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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