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Temporary work agencies and equilibrium unemployment

  • Neugart, Michael
  • Storrie, Donald

During the 1990s, temporary agency work has increased rapidly in most OECD countries. We augment the equilibrium unemployment model developed by Pissarides and Mortensen with temporary work agencies. Our model implies that technological improvements for placements and de-regulation of the sector caused the emergence and growth of temporary agency work. Simulations of a calibrated version of the model show that `temp' work does not necessarily crowd out other, ‘regular’ jobs.

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Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment with number FS I 02-203.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzblpe:fsi02203
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  1. Etienne Wasmer, 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," Working Papers 97-15, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  2. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 616, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Fonseca, Raquel & Lopez-Garcia, Paloma & Pissarides, Christopher A., 2001. "Entrepreneurship, start-up costs and employment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 692-705, May.
  4. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
  5. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2000. "Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?," IZA Discussion Papers 205, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Saint-Paul, G., 1995. "A Framework for Analyzing the Political Support for Active Labor Market Policy," DELTA Working Papers 95-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  7. David T. Coe & Dennis J. Snower, 1997. "Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labor Market Reform," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(1), pages 1-35, March.
  8. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 1998:2, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  9. Bertil Holmlund & Donald Storrie, 2002. "Temporary Work In Turbulent Times: The Swedish Experience," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F245-F269, June.
  10. Almus, Matthias & Egeln, Jürgen & Lechner, Michael & Pfeiffer, Friedhelm & Spengler, Hannes, 1998. "Die gemeinnützige Arbeitnehmerüberlassung in Rheinland-Pfalz: Eine ökonometrische Analyse des Wiedereingliederungserfolgs," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-36, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  11. Holmlund, Bertil & Linden, Johan, 1993. "Job matching, temporary public employment, and equilibrium unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 329-343, July.
  12. Dolado, Juan J. & Felgueroso, Florentino & Jimeno, Juan F., 2000. "Explaining Youth Labor Market Problems in Spain: Crowding-Out, Institutions, or Technology Shifts?," IZA Discussion Papers 142, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Juan J Dolado & Carlos Garcia--Serrano & Juan F. Jimeno, 2002. "Drawing Lessons From The Boom Of Temporary Jobs In Spain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(721), pages F270-F295, June.
  14. Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  16. David H. Autor, 2000. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," NBER Working Papers 7637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Peter AUER & Sandrine CAZES, 2000. "The resilience of the long-term employment relationship: Evidence from the industrialized countries," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 139(4), pages 379-408, December.
  18. Susan N. Houseman & Arne L. Kalleberg & George A. Erickcek, 2001. "The Role of Temporary Help Employment in Tight Labor Markets," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 01-73, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  19. Diamond, Peter A, 1981. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 798-812, August.
  20. Dolado, Juan J. & Felgueroso, Florentino & Jimeno, Juan F., 2000. "Youth labour markets in Spain: Education, training, and crowding-out," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 943-956, May.
  21. Burda, Michael C, 1992. " A Note on Firing Costs and Severance Benefits in Equilibrium Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(3), pages 479-89.
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