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Screening Disability Insurance Applications

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Philip de Jong
  • Maarten Lindeboom
  • Bas van der Klaauw

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in two of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Stricter screening seems to improve targeting efficiency, without inducing negative spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. The costs of stricter screening are only a small fraction of the monetary benefits.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01002.x
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Article provided by European Economic Association in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 9 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 106-129

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:9:y:2011:i:1:p:106-129
DOI: j.1542-4774.2010.01002.x
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
  • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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  1. Olof Åslund & John Östh & Yves Zenou, 2010. "How important is access to jobs? Old question--improved answer," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 389-422, May.
  2. Philip de Jong & Maarten Lindeboom & Bas van der Klaauw, 2011. "Screening Disability Insurance Applications," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 106-129, 02.
  3. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
  4. Öster, Anna, 2006. "Parental unemployment and children's school performance," Working Paper Series 2006:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  5. Bound, John & Burkhauser, Richard V., 1999. "Economic analysis of transfer programs targeted on people with disabilities," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 51, pages 3417-3528 Elsevier.
  6. Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
  7. Halpern, Janice & Hausman, Jerry A., 1986. "Choice under uncertainty: A model of applications for the social security disability insurance program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 131-161, November.
  8. Keisuke Hirano & Guido W. Imbens & Geert Ridder, 2003. "Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment Effects Using the Estimated Propensity Score," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1161-1189, 07.
  9. Bertil Holmlund & Qian Liu & Oskar Nordström Skans, 2008. "Mind the gap? Estimating the effects of postponing higher education," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 683-710, October.
  10. Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 859-876, August.
  11. Anders Forslund & Oskar Nordström Stans, 2006. "Swedish Youth Labour Market Policies Revisited," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 75(3), pages 168-185.
  12. Wang, Iris J Y & Carling, Kenneth & Nääs, Ola, 2006. "High school students' summer jobs and their ensuing labour market achievement," Working Paper Series 2006:14, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  13. Johansson, Per, 2006. "Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect," Working Paper Series 2006:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  14. Per Johansson & Mårten Palme, 2002. "Assessing the Effect of Public Policy on Worker Absenteeism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 381-409.
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