Temptation and Revealed Preference
Gul and Pesendorfer  model the static behavior of an agent who ranks menus prior to the experience of temptation. This paper models the dy- namic behavior of an agent whose ranking of menus itself is subject to temptation. The representation for the agent?s dynamically inconsistent choice behavior views him as possessing a dynamically consistent view of what choices he "should" make (a normative preference) and being tempted by menus that contain tempting alternatives. Foundations for the model re- quire a departure from Gul and Pesendorfer's idea that temptation creates a preference for commitment. Instead, it is hypothesized that distancing an agent from the consequences of his choices separates normative preference and temptation.
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|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/
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- Jawwad Noor, 2005.
"Commitment and Self-Control,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2005-014, Boston University - Department of Economics.
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