Temptation and Social Preference
This paper shows in an experiment that giving rates in a dictator game increase significantly if payments are offered with delay. We hypothesize that a temptation to be selfish may be at play in social preferences. We model this and demonstrate that our model is consistent with much of the existing evidence on dictator games as well. The possible relationship with other social preference theories, such as warm glow, altruism and concern for social image, are discussed and differences in welfare conclusions highlighted.
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|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
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Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/
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- Noor, Jawwad, 2007.
"Commitment and self-control,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 1-34, July.
- Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Commitment and Self-Control," Microeconomics 0509008, EconWPA.
- Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Commitment and Self-Control," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-014, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Jawwad Noor, 2010.
"Temptation and Revealed Preference,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2010-040, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Stefano DellaVigna & John A. List & Ulrike Malmendier, 2009.
"Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving,"
NBER Working Papers
15629, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stefano DellaVigna & John A. List & Ulrike Malmendier, 2012. "Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 1-56.
- John List & Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2012. "Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving," Natural Field Experiments 00137, The Field Experiments Website.
- Nicholas Bardsley, 2008. "Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 122-133, June.
- John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 482-493.
- Kopylov Igor, 2009. "Temptations in General Settings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, September.
- Neilson, William S., 2009. "A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 394-403, May.
- Edward Lazear & Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Sorting, Prices, and Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 12041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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