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Menu-Dependent Self-Control

  • Jawwad Noor


    (Department of Economics, Boston University)

The literature on self-control problems has typically put forth models that imply behavior that is consistent with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Prefer- ence. Thus, while choice is hypothesized to be the outcome of some under- lying internal con.ict, the resulting choices are perfectly consistent across choice problems. We argue that such consistency is not to be expected from agents who suffer from self-control problems because an agent's ability to resist temptation may well depend on what alternatives are available to him. That is, self-control may be menu-dependent. This paper generalizes Gul and Pesendorfer [9] in a way that permits abstract menu-dependent self-control. Various specializations are considered. The foundations of the model require weakening Gul and Pesendorfer [9]'s Independence and Set-Betweenness ax- ioms.

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Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2006-021.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-021
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  1. Manel Baucells & Franz Heukamp, 2010. "Common ratio using delay," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(1), pages 149-158, February.
  2. Kopylov Igor, 2009. "Temptations in General Settings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, September.
  3. Dubra, Juan & Maccheroni, Fabio & Ok, Efe A., 2004. "Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 118-133, March.
  4. Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
  5. David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1449-1476, December.
  6. Halevy, Yoram, 2004. "Strotz meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect," working papers yoram_halevy-2004-16, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 25 Feb 2014.
  7. Noor, Jawwad & Takeoka, Norio, 2010. "Uphill self-control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.
  8. Eddie Dekel & Barton Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Temptation–Driven Preferences," Discussion Papers 1423, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Loewenstein, George & O'Donoghue, Ted, 2004. "Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior," Working Papers 04-14, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  10. Jawwad Noor, 2005. "Temptation, Welfare and Revealed Preference," Microeconomics 0509009, EconWPA.
  11. Kalyan Chatterjee & R. Vijay Krishna, 2005. "Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000576, David K. Levine.
  12. Larry Epstein & Igor Kopylov, 2006. "Cognitive Dissonance and Choice," RCER Working Papers 525, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  13. Shiv, Baba & Fedorikhin, Alexander, 1999. " Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making," Journal of Consumer Research, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 278-92, December.
  14. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
  15. Haluk Ergin & Todd Sarver, 2010. "A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1285-1339, 07.
  16. John E. Stovall, 2010. "Multiple Temptations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 349-376, 01.
  17. Nicholas Bardsley, 2008. "Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(2), pages 122-133, June.
  18. Benhabib, Jess & Bisin, Alberto, 2005. "Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: A neuroeconomics approach to consumption-saving decisions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 460-492, August.
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