Time Inconsistency And Learning In Bargaining Games
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- Zafer Akin, 2007. "Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 275-299, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
- E. S. Phelps & R. A. Pollak, 1968. "On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 185-199.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Incentives for Procrastinators," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816.
- Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jinrui Pan & Craig Webb & Horst Zank, 2013. "Discounting the Subjective Present and Future," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1305, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Akin, Zafer, 2009.
"Imperfect information processing in sequential bargaining games with present biased preferences,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 642-650, August.
- Zafer Akin, 2008. "Imperfect Information Processing in Sequential Bargaining Games with Present Biased Preferences," Working Papers 0810, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Claudia Cerrone, 2016. "Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2011.
"Performance of procrastinators: on the value of deadlines,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 329-366, March.
- Herweg, Fabian & Müller, Daniel, 2008. "Performance of Procrastinators: On the Value of Deadlines," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 3/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Herweg, Fabian & Müller, Daniel, 2011. "Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines," Munich Reprints in Economics 19454, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Akin, Zafer, 2012.
"Intertemporal decision making with present biased preferences,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 30-47.
- Zafer Akin, 2010. "Intertemporal Decision Making with Present Biased Preferences," Working Papers 1001, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Pan, Jinrui & Webb, Craig S. & Zank, Horst, 2015. "An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 43-55.
- Joshua S. Gans & Peter Landry, 2016. "Procrastination in Teams," NBER Working Papers 21891, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Haan, Marco & Hauck, Dominic, 2014. "Games With Possibly Naive Hyperbolic Discounters," MPRA Paper 57960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2015. "Time Preferences and Bargaining," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/568, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Lu, Shih En, 2016. "Self-control and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 390-413.
More about this item
KeywordsHyperbolic discounting; learning; bargaining; delay;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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