Procrastination in Teams
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: PR
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Roland Bénabou, 2013.
"Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 429-462.
- Bénabou, Roland, 2009. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 7193, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Benabou, Roland, 2013. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 7322, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Roland Bénabou, 2009. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," NBER Working Papers 14764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995.
"On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
- Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson, 2010. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 542, David K. Levine.
- Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2001. "Rush and Procrastination under Hyperbolic Discounting and Interdependent Activities," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 141-164, March.
- Pietro Ortoleva, 2012. "Modeling the Change of Paradigm: Non-Bayesian Reactions to Unexpected News," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2410-2436, October.
- Akerlof, George A, 1991.
"Procrastination and Obedience,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
- Akerlof, George, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," Institute for Policy Reform Working Paper Series 294661, Institute for Policy Reform.
- Akerlof, George, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," Institute for Policy Reform Archive 294661, Institute for Policy Reform.
- Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1989. "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 583-601.
- Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006.
"A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
- Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2004. "A Change Would Do You Good . . . An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 606.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Haan, Marco & Hauck, Dominic, 2014. "Games With Possibly Naive Hyperbolic Discounters," MPRA Paper 57960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zafer Akin, 2007.
"Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 275-299, October.
- Zafer Akin, 2005. "Time Inconsistency And Learning In Bargaining Games," Game Theory and Information 0507003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1994.
"The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge,"
NBER Chapters, in: Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, Third Edition, pages 299-322,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1137-1160.
- Becker, G.S. & Murphy, K.M., 1991. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 92-5, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
- Gary S. Murphy Becker & Kevin M., 1992. "The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 79, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2005.
"Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation,"
International Economic Association Series, in: Bina Agarwal & Alessandro Vercelli (ed.), Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour, chapter 2, pages 19-57,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001.
"Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
- Miguel Costa-Gomes & Vincent P. Crawford & Bruno Broseta, "undated". "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games:An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 00/45, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Broseta, Bruno & Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P., 2000. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0fp8278k, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P. & Broseta, Bruno, 1998. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt1vn4h7x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Diekmann, Andreas, 1993. "Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(1), pages 75-85.
- Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001.
"Choice and Procrastination,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 121-160.
- Ted O' Donoghue and Matthew Rabin., 2000. "Choice and Procrastination," Economics Working Papers E00-281, University of California at Berkeley.
- Ted O' Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Choice and Procrastination," Microeconomics 0012002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- O'Donoghue, Ted & Rabin, Matthew, 2000. "Choice and Procrastination," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5r26k54p, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- David Laibson, 1997.
"Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
- Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Botond Köszegi, 2006. "Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 673-707, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Gans, Joshua S. & Landry, Peter, 2022. "I’m not sure what to think about them: Confronting naive present bias in a dynamic threshold public goods game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 195-204.
- Yixuan Shi, 2022. "Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma with Procrastinators," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Xavier Gabaix, 2017.
"Behavioral Inattention,"
NBER Working Papers
24096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gabaix, Xavier, 2018. "Behavioral Inattention," CEPR Discussion Papers 13268, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sergeyev, Dmitriy & Iovino, Luigi, 2018. "Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies Without Rational Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 13100, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012.
"Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
- Binswanger, J. & Prüfer, J., 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," Other publications TiSEM 6ebfff9d-e076-4d09-90c6-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2022.
"Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1146-1172, September.
- Hyndman, Kyle & Terracol, Antoine & Vaksmann, Jonathan, 2013. "Beliefs and (In)Stability in Normal-Form Games," MPRA Paper 47221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2022. "Beliefs and (in)stability in normal-form games," Post-Print hal-03709691, HAL.
- Shapiro, Dmitry & Shi, Xianwen & Zillante, Artie, 2014. "Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 308-329.
- Akin, Zafer, 2012.
"Intertemporal decision making with present biased preferences,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 30-47.
- Zafer Akin, 2010. "Intertemporal Decision Making with Present Biased Preferences," Working Papers 1001, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Joshua Zonca & Giorgio Coricelli & Luca Polonio, 2019. "Does exposure to alternative decision rules change gaze patterns and behavioral strategies in games?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 14-25, August.
- Polonio, Luca & Coricelli, Giorgio, 2019. "Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 566-586.
- Penczynski, Stefan P., 2017. "The nature of social learning: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 148-165.
- repec:osf:socarx:ymzrd_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Marco Serena, 2017. "A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-12, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Jianjun Miao, 2008.
"Option exercise with temptation,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 473-501, March.
- Jianjun Miao, 2004. "Option Exercise with Temptation," Microeconomics 0409002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Junjian Miao, 2005. "Option Exercise with Temptation," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-007, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009.
"Learning and sophistication in coordination games,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 450-472, December.
- Kyle Hydman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games," Post-Print hal-00607232, HAL.
- Kyle Hydman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00607232, HAL.
- Kyle Hydman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607232, HAL.
- Penczynski, Stefan P., 2016. "Strategic thinking: The influence of the game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 72-84.
- Markus K. Brunnermeier & Filippos Papakonstantinou & Jonathan A. Parker, 2017. "Optimal Time-Inconsistent Beliefs: Misplanning, Procrastination, and Commitment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1318-1340, May.
- Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Akin, Zafer, 2009.
"Imperfect information processing in sequential bargaining games with present biased preferences,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 642-650, August.
- Zafer Akin, 2008. "Imperfect Information Processing in Sequential Bargaining Games with Present Biased Preferences," Working Papers 0810, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Jacob K Goeree & Bernardo Garcia-Pola, 2023. "S Equilibrium: A Synthesis of (Behavioral) Game Theory," Papers 2307.06309, arXiv.org.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021.
"Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2018. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," ECON - Working Papers 292, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2019.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HPE-2016-03-29 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2016-03-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2016-03-29 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21891. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/21891.html