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Learning and sophistication in coordination games

  • Kyle Hyndman

    ()

  • Antoine Terracol

    ()

  • Jonathan Vaksmann

    ()

This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions--the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent's actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers' behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y
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Article provided by Springer & Economic Science Association in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 450-472

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:12:y:2009:i:4:p:450-472
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y
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