Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
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- Vriend, Nicolaas J., 1997. "Will reasoning improve learning?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 9-18, August.
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- Toshihiro Matsumura & Akira Ogawa, 2009. "Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 265-272, July.
- Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
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