Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition
This paper explores the medium-run behaviour of bounded rational players in repeatedly played games when they occasionally experiment or make mistakes. The formal analysis introduces a hierarchical structure of limit sets to characterize the most possible medium-run behaviour over gradually increased time intervals. The paper refines the notion of stochastic stability and offers a precise measure of the speed at which stochastically stable equilibria occur. Finally, the paper applies the results to a 3x3 symmetric game of Young (1993).
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