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Imitation, local interaction, and coordination


  • Hsiao-Chi Chen


  • Yunshyong Chow


  • Li-Chau Wu



This paper analyzes players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imitation and one-dimensional local interaction. Players are assumed to interact with their two neighbors and to imitate actions with the highest average payoffs. We find that the payoff-dominant equilibrium survives in the long run with positive probability. The results derive the conditions under which both risk-dominant-strategy and payoff-dominant-strategy takers co-exist in the long run. The risk-dominant equilibrium is the unique long-run equilibrium for the remaining cases. This study extends and complements the analyses of Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998 ) and Vega-Redondo (Evolution, games, and economic behaviour, 1996 ). Combining Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer’s (Econ Lett 93:163–168, 2006 ; J Econ Theory 14:251–274, 2008 ) and our results, we conclude that players’ long-run behavior varies with imitation rules and information collecting modes. Finally, we show the convergence rate to all the long-run equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Li-Chau Wu, 2013. "Imitation, local interaction, and coordination," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 1041-1057, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:1041-1057 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0353-7

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Apesteguia, Jose & Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 2007. "Imitation--theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 217-235, September.
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    5. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    6. Robson, Arthur J. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1996. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 65-92, July.
    7. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125.
    8. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    9. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    10. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    11. Anwar, A. W., 2002. "On the Co-existence of Conventions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 145-155, November.
    12. Robles, Jack, 1998. "Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 207-223, April.
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    15. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    16. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2008. "Contagion and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 251-274, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters & Frank Thuijsman & Philippe Uyttendaele, 2016. "Network Characteristics Enabling Efficient Coordination: A Simulation Study," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 495-519, December.
    2. Cui, Zhiwei, 2014. "More neighbors, more efficiency," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 103-115.
    3. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2017. "An Evolutionary Approach to International Environmental Agreements with Full Participation," RIEEM Discussion Paper Series 1702, Research Institute for Environmental Economics and Management, Waseda University.

    More about this item


    Coordination game; Imitation; Local interaction; C72; C73; D83;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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