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Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

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  • Blume, Andreas
  • Arnold, Tone

Abstract

We analyze simple adaptive learning processes to model the evolution of effective communication in cheap-talk games with initially meaningless signals. We suggest that learning rules may be sensitive to the information available to players at the population level. As a consequence, learning outcomes may depend on this information. We show that more information can be a barrier to comunication if new messages are introduced by mistake. If on the other hand the source of new messages is deliberate experimentation, then more information is not detrimental to communication.
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  • Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:240-259
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    Cited by:

    1. Schopohl, Simon, 2016. "Communication games with optional verification," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 569, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01490688, HAL.
    3. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Post-Print halshs-01960762, HAL.
    4. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
    6. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    7. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01960762, HAL.
    8. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Post-Print halshs-01490688, HAL.

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