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Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

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  • Olszewski, Wojciech

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  • Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:164-186
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1996. "Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-25, January.
    2. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
    3. Blume Andreas & Sobel Joel, 1995. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 359-382, April.
    4. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
    5. Blume Andreas, 1994. "Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 66-77, October.
    6. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
    7. Blume, Andreas & DeJong, Douglas V. & Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2001. "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 79-120, October.
    8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    9. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
    10. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
    11. Blume, Andreas, 1996. "Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 2-25, March.
    12. Zapater, Inigo, 1997. "Credible Proposals in Communication Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 173-197, January.
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