IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements

  • Matthew Rabin and Joel Sobel.

Many standard solution concepts rule out those Nash equilibria that are susceptible to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only which equilibria are not susceptible to deviations, but also which equilibria are likely to persist in the long run because they are repeatedly deviated to. We call such equilibria recurrent. We explore which equilibria are recurrent based on the deviations underlying each of several prominent signaling refinements. We show that the set of recurrent equilibria based on Cho and Krep's (1987) intuitive criterion and Kohlberg and Mertens's (1986) NWBR criterion are precisely what those papers already predict. In contrast, we show that applying our framework to cheap-talk refinements proposed by Farrell (1993) and Matthews, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite (1991) can 1) make those solution concepts more realistic, 2) guarantee existence, and 3) guarantee meaningful communication in at least one class of games where it is not guaranteed by either Farrell or MOP.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 93-211.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:93-211
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Phone: 510-642-0822
Fax: 510-642-6615
Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econwp.html
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Email:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:93-211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.