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Information Transmission and Preference Similarity

  • Andreas Blume

    (Univ. of Iowa)

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibria in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In {\em partial common interest games} they contain only informative equilibria. The stability requirement sharpens currently available predictions for such games by (1) weakening the partial common interest condition, (2) ruling out strictly dominated actions, (3) reflecting the informativeness of the sender's strategy in the receiver's reply, and (4) by ruling out pooling actions. This approach is then used as a step toward unifying the study of partial common interest games and of Crawford and Sobel's parametric model of preference similarity.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9605004.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 24 May 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9605004
Note: Zipped using PKZIP v2.04, encoded using UUENCODE v5.15. Zipped file includes 1 file -- ui9603.wpa (Latex, 27 pages)
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  3. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  4. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  5. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1986. "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Discussion Papers 691, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Blume, A., 1993. "Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 93-15, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  8. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
  9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  10. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. J. Farrell, 2010. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 533, David K. Levine.
  12. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
  13. Blume, A. & De Jong, D.V. & Kim, Y.G. & Sprinkle, G.B., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games: An Experiment," Papers 9491, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  14. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt40s882v6, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  15. repec:att:wimass:9218 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
  17. Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 1992. "The Evolutionary Foundations of Backward and Forward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 216, University of Bonn, Germany.
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