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A note on pre-play communication

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  • Sobel, Joel

Abstract

Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of “monotonic” strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate.

Suggested Citation

  • Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:477-486
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020. "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 197-215.
    2. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
    3. Melody Lo, 2021. "Language and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 49-92, July.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
    5. Sobel, Joel, 2019. "Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Dominance; Equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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