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Average Behaviour In Learning Models

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  • CANNING, D.

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  • Canning, D., 1990. "Average Behaviour In Learning Models," Papers 156, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:156
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Di Gioacchino, Debora, 1992. "Learning and equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games : Some simulation results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 405-409, April.
    2. Futia, Carl A, 1982. "Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-408, March.
    3. Canning, D., 1990. "Social Equilibrium," Papers 150, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2009. "Repeated games with one-memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 312-336, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Apesteguia, Jose & Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 2007. "Imitation--theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 217-235, September.
    2. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2011. "Beyond replicator dynamics: Innovation-selection dynamics and optimal diversity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 229-245, May.
    3. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    4. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-110, January.
    5. William Tracy, 2014. "Paradox Lost: The Evolution of Strategies in Selten’s Chain Store Game," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(1), pages 83-103, January.
    6. Cabrales, Antonio & Garcia-Fontes, Walter & Motta, Massimo, 2000. "Risk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 137-162, January.
    7. Karolina Safarzyńska & Jeroen Bergh, 2013. "An evolutionary model of energy transitions with interactive innovation-selection dynamics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 271-293, April.
    8. Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Jensen, Mogens & Sloth, Birgitte, 2001. "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 34-63, January.
    9. Jean-Michel Grandmont, 1998. "Expectations Formation and Stability of Large Socioeconomic Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 741-782, July.
    10. Blume, Lawrence E., 2003. "How noise matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 251-271, August.
    11. Dai, Darong, 2012. "Learning Nash Equilibria," MPRA Paper 40040, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    13. Huw D. Dixon & Paolo Lupi, "undated". "Learning with a Known Average: A Simulation Study of Alternative Learning Rules," Discussion Papers 97/18, Department of Economics, University of York.
    14. Karolina Safarzyńska & Jeroen Bergh, 2010. "Evolutionary models in economics: a survey of methods and building blocks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 329-373, June.
    15. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
    16. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
    17. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the existence and stability of Pareto optimal endogenous matching with fairness," MPRA Paper 40457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness," MPRA Paper 40560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt68d1t1xg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    20. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    21. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    22. Dixon, Huw David, 2000. "Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-238, October.
    23. Lennox, Clive & Li, Bing, 2014. "Accounting misstatements following lawsuits against auditors," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 58-75.
    24. Paolo Lupi, 1998. "The Propagation of Cooperation in a Model of Learning with Endogenous Aspirations," Research in Economics 98-06-052e, Santa Fe Institute.
    25. Ramsza, Michal & Seymour, Robert M., 2010. "Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 303-324, January.

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