Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400170
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- Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 4/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
Citations
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Cited by:
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006.
"Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot,"
Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 9-9.
- Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006. "Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot," Post-Print ujm-00121658, HAL.
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2009.
"Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1981-1990, December.
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2002. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 29/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 53, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot oligopoly," Working Papers 67, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Xiaomeng Ding & Simon Weidenholzer & Boyu Zhang, 2025. "Evolving Rules: Imitation and Best Response Learning in Cournot Oligopoly," Papers 2511.09839, arXiv.org.
- Hirth Hans & Walther Martin, 2018. "Strategic Effects between Price-takers and Non-price-takers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-18, July.
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021.
"The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 417-454, May.
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 35/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 68, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2019. "The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism, and Complete Ignorance," Working Papers 334, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Birgitte Sloth & Hans Whitta-Jacobsen, 2011.
"Economic Darwinism,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 385-398, March.
- Birgitte Sloth & Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, 2006. "Economic Darwinism," CIE Discussion Papers 2006-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011.
"Nonspecific Networking,"
Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2004. "Nonspecific Networking," Game Theory and Information 0403005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific networking," Post-Print halshs-00667662, HAL.
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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