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Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

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  • Burkhard Schipper

Abstract

Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking games and generalized Nash-Demand games.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 4/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:42003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    3. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2001. "Evolutionary Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 620, CESifo.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
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    Citations

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    2. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, 2006. "Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 9-9.
    3. Xiaomeng Ding & Simon Weidenholzer & Boyu Zhang, 2025. "Evolving Rules: Imitation and Best Response Learning in Cournot Oligopoly," Papers 2511.09839, arXiv.org.
    4. Hirth Hans & Walther Martin, 2018. "Strategic Effects between Price-takers and Non-price-takers," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-18, July.
    5. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2021. "The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 417-454, May.
    6. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
    7. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2009. "Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1981-1990, December.
    8. Birgitte Sloth & Hans Whitta-Jacobsen, 2011. "Economic Darwinism," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 385-398, March.

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    More about this item

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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