Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Alex Possajennikov, 2003.
"Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 921-928, June.
- Alex Possajennikov, 2001. "Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior," Discussion Papers in Economics 01_10, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
- Stegeman, Mark & Rhode, Paul, 2004. "Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 171-214, October.
- Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? : A Darwinian model of economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, August.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan, 2009. "Cooperation through imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 376-388, November.
- Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
- Corchon, Luis C., 1994. "Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 151-165, December.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 2004. "Comparative Learning Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(2), pages 431-465, May.
- Burkhard C. Schipper, 2004.
"Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 471-477, August.
- Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse4_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Wambach, Achim, 2010.
"Survival at the center--The stability of minimum differentiation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 853-858, December.
- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Achim Wambach, 2010. "Survival at the Center - The Stability of Minimum Differentiation," Post-Print hal-00911820, HAL.
More about this item
KeywordsEvolutionary game theory; Darwinian evolution; Economic selection; Mutation; Evolutionary equilibrium; Stochastic stability;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:3:p:385-398. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .