Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games (new title: Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games)
The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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- Alex Possajennikov, 2003.
"Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(4), pages 921-928, 06.
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- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2003. "Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation," Discussion Papers in Economics 03_01, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics.
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- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "The evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-55, February.
- Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Wolfgang Leininger, 2002. "Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 713, CESifo Group Munich. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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