IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_713.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Leininger

Abstract

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we identify with evolutionary equilibrium. It coincides with Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory, if and only if groups are symmetric. For asymmetric groups it always proposes a different and arguably more sensible solution than Nash equilibrium. We explore the properties of (local) ESS in detail.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Leininger, 2002. "Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 713, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_713
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/713.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, July.
    2. Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger & Alex Possajennikov, 2001. "Evolutionary Rent-Seeking," CESifo Working Paper Series 620, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Katz, Eliakim & Nitzan, Shmuel & Rosenberg, Jacob, 1990. "Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 49-60, April.
    4. Riaz, Khalid & Shogren, Jason F & Johnson, Stanley R, 1995. "A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(3-4), pages 243-259, March.
    5. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1993. "Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 363-367.
    6. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B., 2001. "Local equilibria in economic games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 165-173, February.
    7. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hehenkamp, B. & Leininger, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2004. "Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1045-1057, November.
    2. Sina Risse, 2011. "Two-stage group rent-seeking with negatively interdependent preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 259-276, June.
    3. Wolfgang Leininger, 2004. "Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games (new title: Fending off one means fending off all: evolutionary stability in quasi-submodular aggregative games)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1266, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contests; public goods; evolutionary stability.;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_713. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.