Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (06)
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