Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior
I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite populations in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2001|
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