Convergence in Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning
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- Murat Yildizoglu & T. Vallée, 2007. "Convergence in Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Post-Print hal-00394413, HAL.
- T. Vallée & Murat Yildizoglu, 2007. "Convergence in Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Post-Print hal-00293929, HAL.
- T. Vallée & Murat Yildizoglu, 2007. "Convergence in Finite Cournot Oligopoly with Social and Individual Learning," Post-Print hal-00293948, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Stegeman, Mark & Rhode, Paul, 2004. "Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 171-214, October.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
- Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2000. "An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-19, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mattheos Protopapas & Francesco Battaglia & Elias Kosmatopoulo, 2008.
"Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games,"
- Protopapas, M.K. & Kosmatopoulos, E.B. & Battaglia, F., 2009. "Coevolutionary Genetic Algorithms for Establishing Nash Equilibrium in Symmetric Cournot Games," MPRA Paper 15375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsCournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash equilibrium; Genetic algorithms;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-07-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CMP-2007-07-13 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-07-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EVO-2007-07-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-07-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2007-07-13 (Microeconomics)
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