IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(200612)1624_702cowlri_2.0.tx_2-w.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cournot or Walras? Long-Run Results in Oligopoly Games

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Riechmann

Abstract

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walrasian equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long-run outcome. The apparent difference between social and individual learning is caused by different degrees of rationality of the learning agents: Learning the Cournot strategy requires the agents to acquire a large amount of information and behavioral sophistication, while the Walrasian strategy can be shown to be a particular "low-rationality result."

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Riechmann, 2006. "Cournot or Walras? Long-Run Results in Oligopoly Games," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 702-720, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_702:cowlri_2.0.tx_2-w
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2006/00000162/00000004/art00008
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arifovic, Jasmina, 1994. "Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 3-28, January.
    2. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    3. Michael Kopel & Herbert Dawid, 1998. "On economic applications of the genetic algorithm: a model of the cobweb type," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 297-315.
    4. Rhode, Paul & Stegeman, Mark, 2001. "Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 415-453, March.
    5. Franklin M. Fisher, 1961. "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution: The Effects of Speeds of Adjustment and Increasing Marginal Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 125-135.
    6. F. H. Hahn, 1962. "The Stability of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(4), pages 329-331.
    7. Thomas Riechmann, 1999. "Learning and behavioral stability An economic interpretation of genetic algorithms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 225-242.
    8. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2011. "Economic modeling using evolutionary algorithms: the effect of a binary encoding of strategies," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 737-756, December.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:29:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Vallée, Thomas & YIldIzoglu, Murat, 2009. "Convergence in the finite Cournot oligopoly with social and individual learning," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 670-690, November.
    4. Koch, Rosemarie & Stadtmann, Georg, 2010. "Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung," Discussion Papers 288, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    5. repec:spr:joevec:v:27:y:2017:i:5:d:10.1007_s00191-017-0536-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Thomas Riechmann, 2007. "An analysis of rent-seeking games with relative-payoff maximizers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 147-155, October.
    7. Thomas Riechmann, 2006. "Mixed motives in a Cournot game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(29), pages 1-8.
    8. repec:eee:dyncon:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:257-272 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_702:cowlri_2.0.tx_2-w. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohr.de/jite .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.