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Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung

  • Koch, Rosemarie
  • Stadtmann, Georg
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    Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer empirischen Analyse kurz auf erste Umsetzungen der Gesetzgebung durch die Unternehmen ein.

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    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43593/1/641453752.pdf
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    Paper provided by European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 288.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:288
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    1. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Peters, Heiko, 2007. "Personelle Unternehmensverflechtung und Vorstandsgehälter," IÖB-Diskussionspapiere 6/07, University of Münster, Institute for Economic Education.
    3. Owen A. Lamont & Jeremy C. Stein, 2006. "Investor Sentiment and Corporate Finance: Micro and Macro," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 147-151, May.
    4. Thomas Riechmann, 2006. "Cournot or Walras? Long-Run Results in Oligopoly Games," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(4), pages 702-720, December.
    5. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    6. Jensen, Michael C., 1978. "Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2-3), pages 95-101.
    7. Holderness, Clifford G., 1990. "Liability insurers as corporate monitors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 115-129, September.
    8. Kramer, Walter & Runde, Ralf, 1996. "Stochastic Properties of German Stock Returns," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 281-306.
    9. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    10. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
    11. M. Martin Boyer, 2003. "Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-42, CIRANO.
    12. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
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