Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsVorstandsvergütung; Angemessenheit; Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehung;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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