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Socially Responsible Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Renneboog, L.D.R.

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

  • Liang, H.

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

  • Ferrell, A.

Abstract

In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.
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Suggested Citation

  • Renneboog, L.D.R. & Liang, H. & Ferrell, A., 2014. "Socially Responsible Firms," Discussion Paper 2014-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutil:b543ca6a-e8f8-490e-9ae2-db2d8ee085c7
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate social responsibility; agency problems; value enhancement; Corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

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