Do directors perform for pay?
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More about this item
KeywordsDirectors Executive compensation Incentives Attendance Board meetings;
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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