Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00176789, HAL.
- Dickinson, David L. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010, HAL.
- David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie," Post-Print halshs-00180112, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000.
"A Fine is a Price,"
The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "A fine is a price," Natural Field Experiments 00258, The Field Experiments Website.
- Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972.
"Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
- Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004.
"Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1379-1389, October.
- Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2003. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-69, CIRANO.
- Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students," Artefactual Field Experiments 00099, The Field Experiments Website.
- Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00161723, HAL.
- Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," IZA Discussion Papers 1057, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00175004, HAL.
- Minkler, Lanse, 2004.
"Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitudes,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 863-884, June.
- Lanse Minkler, 2002. "Shirking and Motivation in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes," Working papers 2002-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Lanse Minkler, 2002. "Shirking and Motivations in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes," Working papers 2002-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1978. "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 943-952, October.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000.
"Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1057-1068, May.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices," IEW - Working Papers 020, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices," Munich Reprints in Economics 20659, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Discussion Paper 1998-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Other publications TiSEM 641eb9a4-f245-483b-8c01-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074.
- Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
- Gary Charness & Luca Rigotti & Aldo Rustichini, 2007. "Individual Behavior and Group Membership," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1340-1352, September.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003.
"Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism,"
Nature, Nature, vol. 422(6928), pages 137-140, March.
- Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2000. "Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 245, CESifo.
- Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, "undated".
"Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure,"
IEW - Working Papers
144, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ichino, Andrea & Falk, Armin, 2003. "Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure," CEPR Discussion Papers 3834, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Falk, Armin & Ichino, Andrea, 2003. "Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure," IZA Discussion Papers 732, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Armin Falk & Andrea Ichino, 2003. "Clean evidence on peer pressure," Natural Field Experiments 00239, The Field Experiments Website.
- Falk, Armin & Gachter, Simon & Kovacs, Judit, 1999. "Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives in a repeated game with incomplete contracts," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 251-284, June.
- David Sally, 1995. "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 58-92, January.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated".
"Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?,"
IEW - Working Papers
034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gächter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3017, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- van Dijk, Frans & Sonnemans, Joep & van Winden, Frans, 2001.
"Incentive systems in a real effort experiment,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 187-214, February.
- Frans van Dijk & Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Winden, 1998. "Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-023/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Frans van Dijk & Joep Sonnemans & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Incentive Systems in a Real Effort Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 272, CESifo.
- Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S. & Huck, Steffen, 2001.
"More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding,"
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(1), pages 131-144, March.
- Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, "undated". "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers 052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Daniel S. Nagin & James B. Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, 2002.
"Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 850-873, September.
- Daniel Nagin & James Rebitzer & Seth Sanders & Lowell Taylor, 2002. "Monitoring, Motivation and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 8811, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hollander, Heinz, 1990. "A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1157-1167, December.
- Günther G. Schulze & Björn Frank, 2003.
"Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 143-160, August.
- Bjorn Frank & Guenther G. Schulze, 2000. "Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0950, Econometric Society.
- Schulze, Günther G. & Frank, Björn, 2000. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility," Discussion Papers, Series I 303, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
- Lin, Chung-cheng & Yang, C.C., 2006. "Fine enough or don't fine at all," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-213, February.
- Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
- Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004.
"The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
- E. Fehr & John A. List, "undated". "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs," IEW - Working Papers 134, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs," Labor and Demography 0409012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & John List, 2004. "The hidden costs and returns of incentives - trust and trustworthiness among ceos," Artefactual Field Experiments 00044, The Field Experiments Website.
- Heath, Chip, 1999. "On the Social Psychology of Agency Relationships: Lay Theories of Motivation Overemphasize Extrinsic Incentives," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 25-62, April.
- Gerardo A. Guerra, 2002. "Crowding Out Trust: The Adverse Effects of Verification. An Experiment," Economics Series Working Papers 98, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Sillamaa, M. A., 1999. "How work effort responds to wage taxation: An experimental test of a zero top marginal tax rate," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-134, July.
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
- Simon G�chter & Armin Falk, "undated". "Work motivation, institutions, and performance," IEW - Working Papers 062, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
- Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006.
"The Hidden Costs of Control,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, "undated". "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers 250, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Dickinson, David L, 1999. "An Experimental Examination of Labor Supply and Work Intensities," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 638-670, October.
- Uri Gneezy, 2003. "The W effect of incentives," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000315, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Frey, Bruno S, 1993. "Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(4), pages 663-670, October.
- HarryG. Barkma*, 1995. "Do Top Managers Work Harder When They Are Monitored?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 19-42, February.
- Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014.
"Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-00965532, HAL.
- Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014. "Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion," Working Papers halshs-00965532, HAL.
- Dirk Sliwka, 2007.
"Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.
- Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 2293, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2006. "Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation," IZA Discussion Papers 2423, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Seeun JUNG, 2014. "Risk Attitudes and Shirking on the Quality of Work under Monitoring: Evidence from a Real-Effort Task Experiment," THEMA Working Papers 2014-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2008. "Relative rewards within team-based compensation," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 141-167, April.
- Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, "undated".
"Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue,"
IEW - Working Papers
164, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2005. "Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue," CREMA Working Paper Series 2005-10, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía Reyes, 2009. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2734, CESifo.
- Uri Gneezy, 2003. "The W effect of incentives," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000315, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated".
"Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation?,"
IEW - Working Papers
034, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Gächter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3017, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011.
"Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330,
Elsevier.
- Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sliwka, Dirk, 2003.
"On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes,"
IZA Discussion Papers
844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Kajackaite, Agne & Werner, Peter, 2015. "The incentive effects of performance requirements – A real effort experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 84-94.
- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, "undated".
"Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control,"
IEW - Working Papers
193, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 4512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust – The Hidden Cost of Control," IZA Discussion Papers 1203, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015.
"Theory And Evidence In Psychology And Economics About Motivation Crowding Out: A Possible Convergence?,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 339-356, April.
- Pierre Garrouste & Agnès Festré, 2014. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print hal-00926326, HAL.
- Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2015. "Theory and evidence in psychology and economics about motivation crowding out: A possible convergence?," Post-Print halshs-01139308, HAL.
- Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004.
"The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
- E. Fehr & John A. List, "undated". "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs," IEW - Working Papers 134, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs," Labor and Demography 0409012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ernst Fehr & John List, 2004. "The hidden costs and returns of incentives - trust and trustworthiness among ceos," Artefactual Field Experiments 00044, The Field Experiments Website.
- Bowles, Samuel & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2008.
"Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(8-9), pages 1811-1820, August.
- Samuel Bowles & Sung Ha Hwang, 2008. "Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2008-06, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Samuel Bowles & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2008. "Social Preferences and Public Economics: Mechanism Design when Social Preferences Depend on Incentives," Department of Economics University of Siena 530, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2009.
"Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 544-555, March.
- Ariely, Dan & Bracha, Anat & Meier, Stephan, 2007. "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially," IZA Discussion Papers 2968, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2007. "Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially," Working Papers 07-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Andrej Angelovski & Daniela Cagno & Daniela Grieco & Werner Güth, 2019. "Trusting versus monitoring: an experiment of endogenous institutional choices," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 329-355, December.
- Amadou Boly, 2011. "On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the field," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 241-253, May.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:56-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.