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Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility

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  • Schulze, Günther G.
  • Frank, Björn

Abstract

This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Schulze, Günther G. & Frank, Björn, 2000. "Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility," Discussion Papers, Series I 303, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:303
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; gender; intrinsic motivation; reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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