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Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments

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  • Eckel, Catherine C
  • Grossman, Philip J

Abstract

Research in social sciences other than economics indicates substantial differences in behavior between men and women. The general conclusion drawn from this work is that women will be more socially-orientated (selfless) and men more individually-orientated (selfish). This paper reports the results of a double-anonymous dictator experiment designed to permit the emergence of basic gender differences in economic behavior. The authors' results are intended to provide a baseline for further research. They find that women, on average, donate twice as much as men to their anonymous partners when any factors that might confound cooperation are eliminated.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 1998. "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 726-735, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:108:y:1998:i:448:p:726-35
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