Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion
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- Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014. "Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion," PSE Working Papers halshs-00965532, HAL.
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Cited by:
- SeEun Jung, 2017.
"The gender wage gap and sample selection via risk attitudes,"
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- Seeun Jung, 2014. "The Gender Wage Gap and Sample Selection via Risk Attitudes," THEMA Working Papers 2014-25, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Seeun Jung, 2014. "The Gender Wage Gap and Sample Selection via Risk Attitudes," Working Papers halshs-00965520, HAL.
- Seeun Jung, 2014. "The Gender Wage Gap and Sample Selection via Risk Attitudes," PSE Working Papers halshs-00965520, HAL.
- Rahul Nilakantan & Deepak Iyengar & Samar K. Datta & Shashank Rao, 0. "On Ethical Violations in Microfinance Backed Small Businesses: Family and Household Welfare," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-18.
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Keywords
Shirking; Monitoring; Risk under Uncertainty; Effort;All these keywords.
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