The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK
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- Rickman, Neil & Witt, Robert, 2003. "The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers 3891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2003. "The determinants of employee crime in the UK," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0703, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cadsby C. Bram & Song Fei & Tapon Francis, 2010.
"Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation,"
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- C. Bram Cadsby & Fei Song & Francis Tapon, 2008. "Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 0810, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2004. "Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition," NBER Working Papers 11006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014. "Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion," PSE Working Papers halshs-00965532, HAL.
- Seeun JUNG, 2014. "Risk Attitudes and Shirking on the Quality of Work under Monitoring: Evidence from a Real-Effort Task Experiment," THEMA Working Papers 2014-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Anna Rita Germani & Antonio Pergolizzi & Filippo Reganati, 2015. "Law Enforcement and Illegal Trafficking of Waste: Evidence from Italy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2673-2684.
More about this item
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
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