IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/ratsoc/v7y1995i1p58-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Author

Listed:
  • DAVID SALLY

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of 35 years of published experiments testing decision making in prisoners' dilemmas. The objective is to begin to reconnect the theory and the evidence of rational behavior by accumulating the experience of the laboratory and examining this record for those factors that consistently altered subjects' choices. It is shown that a model of pure self-interest is usually inconsistent with the results of experimental decision making, predicting either the wrong sign, as in the case of monetary stakes, or ignoring influential variables, such as the content of instructions. This incongruity is widest with respect to the role of language in encouraging cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • David Sally, 1995. "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 58-92, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:58-92
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007001004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1043463195007001004
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1043463195007001004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    3. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
    4. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In The Battle Of The Sexes Game," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    5. Philip S. Gallo Jr & Charles G. McClintock, 1965. "Cooperative and competitive behavior in mixed-motive games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 9(1), pages 68-78, March.
    6. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
    2. Sally, David, 2005. "Can I say "bobobo" and mean "There's no such thing as cheap talk"?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 245-266, July.
    3. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
    4. Eran Guse & M. C. Sunny Wong, 2022. "Communication and Learning: The Bilateral Information Transmission in the Cobweb Model," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(2), pages 693-723, August.
    5. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2006. "Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634, Stockholm School of Economics.
    6. Tetsuo Yamamori & Kazuyuki Iwata, 2023. "Wage claim detracts reciprocity in labor relations: experimental study of gift exchange games," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(3), pages 573-597, July.
    7. Antonio Cabrales & Michalis Drouvelis & Zeynep Gurguy & Indrajit Ray, 2017. "Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 6781, CESifo.
    8. Blume, Andreas & DeJong, Douglas V. & Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2001. "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 79-120, October.
    9. Timothy N Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Coordinating Collective Resistance Through Communication And Repeated Interaction," Monash Economics Working Papers 16/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    10. Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia & Brayan Snehider Díaz, 2022. "Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 17-42, February.
    11. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
    12. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May.
    13. Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2020. "The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 403-415.
    14. Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 153-183, September.
    15. Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick, 2002. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-27, April.
    16. Banerjee, Simanti & Cason, Timothy N. & de Vries, Frans P. & Hanley, Nick, 2017. "Transaction costs, communication and spatial coordination in Payment for Ecosystem Services Schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 68-89.
    17. He, Simin & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2019. "The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 238-273.
    18. Régis Deloche, 1993. "Prospection et accueil d'entreprises par les régions. Un problème gigogne de décision conjointe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(4), pages 809-820.
    19. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information," Discussion Papers 13-01, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    20. Crawford, Vincent P., 2017. "Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 20-31.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:58-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.